The conflict in the former Yugoslavia 
voluntarily surrender themselves or custodial states parties will effectuate the apprehensions and turn them over to the ICC. But should the above fail, the ICC may again be left to consider resorting to other forces already patrolling on the ground or that are planned to be deployed in the near future. These forces may be deployed under the will and This essay will analyze the framework set out by the ICTY Statute, the ICC Statute and the documents enacted under their respective authority pursuant to which the international community may seek the participation of international bodies to enforce international criminal tribunals' arrest mandates. For this purpose, I will first examine the relevant statutory scheme of the ICTY, and second, the relevant statutory scheme of the ICC with an emphasis on the implications of the ICC Statute's regime for cooperation of and judicial assistance by international bodies in light of the ICTY experience.
The ICTY Regime

A. The Tribunal's Powers
The relationship between the ICTY and multinational forces has been a story of regulatory and judicial attempts to delineate the nature and extent of the relationship and adjust to the prevailing situation on the ground in the former Yugoslavia. In the aftermath of the signature of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the ICTY, faced with chronic lack of cooperation by state authorities and division on the United Nations Security Council, was forced to turn to NATO, the only armed force in the region capable of enforcing the Tribunal's arrest warrants. This first section will focus on how the ICTY Statute and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY RPE) have contributed to shape the role of multinational forces in the former Yugoslavia.
The ICTY Statute offers few directions as to whether the Tribunal may rely on multinational forces to effectuate arrests of indicted individuals, this task mainly falling upon the shoulders of the states pursuant to Article 29:
1. States shall co-operate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to: … (d) the arrest or detention of persons;
(e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal.
Only Article 19(2) appears to suggest the possibility that a judge may be authorized to order such action:
2. Upon confirmation of an indictment, the judge may, at the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial.
On its face, a plain reading of Article 19(2) suggests at least that nothing prohibits the to comply with the Tribunal orders for cooperation and judicial assistance in the same manner as states must be understood in the greater factual situation prevailing at the time.
B. The Prosecutor's Powers
The ICTY Statute remains relatively silent about the extent of the ICTY's relationship with international bodies. Within the confines of my above discussion on Article 19(2), it may be noted that the article provides that a judge's power to issue an order for the apprehension of a person indicted by the ICTY is triggered by the Prosecutor's request.
The relationship between the Prosecutor and international bodies is timidly laid out in (7) and (5) Court. In the practice of international courts, Article 52 is a novelty resulting from the balance struck between states' will to not entrust judges with overreaching 'legislative powers' over certain issues of substantive importance and the need for the Court to efficiently conduct its affairs, including the ability to make decisions on subsidiary matters. 40 The criterion of 'routine functioning' has therefore been adopted to distinguish regulations from rules of procedure and evidence, and the term has been interpreted to include 'the internal organization and administration of the Court, but not its relations to the parties before it.' to capture the indicted persons. These organizations now know that the ICC has no power whatsoever to oblige them actively to search and arrest indicted persons. Therefore, assuming such intergovernmental organization is unwilling to risk its troops in this task, it has all the required latitude to frame a general commitment that may be interpreted in a way to defend a subsequent weak implementation or simply refuse to assist the ICC.
In the context of the relationship between the ICTY and IFOR, it has been suggested that while individual states participating in IFOR could be required to execute an ICTY arrest warrant specifically addressed to them, the obligation would not extend upon NATO itself although the acknowledged conclusion was nevertheless that the NATO-led force would be validly bound to execute the ICTY order. 46 The concrete benefits of such option are also difficult to identify: it could be thought that Article 87(6) constitutes a statement that arrangements with intergovernmental 49 The Century Foundation/Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Apprehending Indicted War Criminals, supra note 9, at 93. Cf. Lamb, supra note 6, at 192-194 (evoking a similar argument in the context of the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to a multinational force).
organizations to secure enforcement of the ICC's arrest warrants are an option authorized by the ICC Statute. But if the ICC wanted to ask the cooperation of another organization or the latter were willing to execute the Court's arrest warrants, there is no reason why such initiative would be prohibited. 50 Therefore, at best, Article 87(6) is purely declaratory.
In pursuing the ultimate purpose of investigating and prosecuting the persons accused of the gravest crimes known to humankind, securing the cooperation of all parties involved in the conflict is of crucial importance. After their deployment in the former Yugoslavia in December 1995, NATO forces did not make a single arrest until July 1997. 51 There were embarrassing accounts of high profile war criminals indicted by the ICTY living freely in their neighbourhood and NATO patrols deliberately modifying their route so as to avoid them. 52 It was only a combination of political and judicial pressure that persuaded NATO to shift its policy with respect to the arrest of indicted individuals. In my view, the vital importance of the role of intergovernmental organizations should have been reflected in the ICC Statute by treating them on the same footing as the individual states.
Conclusion
When time comes for the ICC to issue its arrest warrants, it may only rely on a less than handful number of real options. The state party on the territory of which the indicted person is found may decide to diligently enforce the arrest warrant -whether or not as a result of international political pressures -and actively search him for prosecution; or the indicted person might decide to voluntarily surrender himself to the ICC. Today the ICC has the benefit of being able to learn from the experience of preceding international criminal tribunals under which these forms of apprehension or surrender have been attempted or have occurred. This essay was concerned about the other situations when the conventional methods of getting the indicted individuals to face justice fail. And when they do fail, the ICC may probably find itself in a situation similar as in the former Yugoslavia where a multinational force already deployed on the ground was the only force with the capabilities to execute the indictments. In these cases, international bodies ought to be involved not merely because they have the capabilities, but because they are virtually the last resource standing between accountability and impunity.
It must be ensured that these international bodies meet their moral duty within the international criminal law system, as they may not want in the first place to fill the role that the situation has made them take. That is why in these still early stages of the ICC's existence, the extent of their relationship with the ICC should be clearly delineated and strengthened as much as possible. This is necessary because situations like another Karadžić and Mladić or indicted individuals freely attending their daily activities, are situations for which the international community should also say: 'never again'.
This area of public international law may lend itself to paralleling the ICC with domestic courts, and further inquiring upon the efficiency (or weaknesses) of domestic criminal systems where to a certain extent, the enforcement of criminal laws has been automated and it is expected that for each criminal offence committed, a national or local government has pre-committed an amount of its resources to find, try and punish the offender. Although international criminal justice may never have at its disposal the equivalent of the full apparel of domestic law enforcement, the ultimate objective of the international community should nevertheless be the achievement of an efficient and predictable law enforcement system, and being capable to rely on an appropriate force to bring to justice indicted persons is part of the equation. Some authors have evoked and explored the idea of endowing the ICC with its own police force. 53 It may be that the needed reliability will only come under such condition which merits more serious and indepth examination from the decision-makers. The international community has already created for itself this ICC and given it the gigantic task of exercising its jurisdiction over those persons accused of the most serious crimes known to humankind. Therefore with such responsibilities should come appropriate powers.
